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Abstract 
 
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy?  This 
question concerns how we classify political systems in which, despite a formally 
open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other 
political parties and civil society organizations - an indication of a low degree of 
government contestability. In Robert Dahl’s polyarchy, contestability is an essential 
dimension of democracy and, as a result, one-party dominance is classified as an 
‘inclusive hegemony’ outside his conception of democracy. For procedural 
definitions of democracy, however, dominant party systems are legitimate outcomes 
of electoral competition provided that there have been no formal restrictions to the 
exercise of civil and political rights. The article examines the boundaries between 
democracy and authoritarianism, broadens the notion of authoritarian controls to 
include soft manipulative practices and explains why government contestability 
should be regarded as a constitutive property of democracy. 
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The conceptual boundary separating democracy from authoritarianism needs further 
clarification. All definitions describe democracy at minimum as a political system 
that provides citizens with political rights which they are free to exercise in a 
structure open to public participation and electoral competition. This procedural 
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description of democracy, however, is complemented by the pluralist approach to 
political competition, most prominently represented in Robert Dahl’s conception of 
democracy as polyarchy, which requires that, in addition to the existence of an 
inclusive structure of public participation, an elected government must face a 
considerable degree of political contestation generated by the activities of other 
political and social forces during its tenure (Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-9; and 1982, p. 6). 
These two approaches to democracy differ as to whether government contestability is 
a constitutive part of ‘empirical’ democracy and must be included in the standards 
which political societies must meet in order to qualify as democracies, or whether it 
is simply a (desirable) outcome of political participation in a democracy. This 
differentiation poses a noticeable problem in empirical studies seeking to classify 
dominant party systems - political systems with a formal structure for public 
participation and a low degree of government contestability defined as the state of 
affairs in which, despite the presence of elections open to all parties, a single political 
force stays in power over a long period of time facing no serious challenge by other 
political forces with no foreseeable prospect of losing power due to persistently weak 
opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations.  
 
A procedural approach of democracy would regard low levels of government 
contestability as a legitimate outcome insofar as the formal process of participation is 
open and participating citizens are unobstructed by typical authoritarian controls, 
which include direct interventions in formal processes of political participation such 
as the exercise of violence, physical threat or electoral fraud, barriers to entry 
targeting political opponents, banning political activities, the systematic harassment 
of the opposition and the censorship of political expression. In the procedural sense, 
whether citizens choose to contest or not contest is a matter of political behavior 
within the boundaries of democracy, as long as democratic process is open to 
participation. On the other hand, Dahl’s polyarchy has a more demanding standard, 
according to which a regime that exhibits a low degree of government contestation is 
classified as an ‘inclusive hegemony’, a distinct political system that is open to 
citizens’ participation but displays low levels of government contestability (Dahl, 
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1971, pp. 8, 34). Here, the observed pattern of political behavior, i.e. a limited degree 
of government contestability, is elevated to the standard defining the boundaries 
between democracies and non-democracies. 
 
Defining the boundaries between democracy and authoritarianism has become a 
pronounced question in view of the fact that many contemporary dictatorships rely 
less on traditional repressive methods and, instead, use more extensively soft 
manipulation and co-optation tactics to thwart political competition (Boix and 
Svolik, 2013; Gerscheweski, 2013; Franz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014). Dictators allow 
regularly-held elections and the existence of political parties in order to mimic 
democracies, with the purpose of legitimizing and retrenching their regimes (Ezrow 
and Frantz, 2011). Following this trend, a political force can become dominant by 
primarily relying on co-optation and discrimination in the allocation of economic and 
social resources, while making very little use of the conventional methods of political 
repression. As a result, these ‘low-repression’ ‘low-contestability’ regimes are the 
‘greyest’ political systems for the purpose of classification, as the next section 
indicates. Can we characterize these systems as authoritarian even if the recorded 
level of repression is low and the leaders can be voted out of office? 
 
Leaders who enjoy high popularity scores in regimes where the observed electoral 
irregularities are not significant enough to distort actual voting preferences may 
claim that their political dominance is the result of their popularity and not the 
outcome of any observed ‘unsystematic’ flaws in the dimension of political 
participation (Cf. Duvanov, 2013). Existing accounts in the literature have responded 
to this claim by stating that the elections held are unfair primarily as the result of soft 
manipulation of electoral behavior. But in theoretical terms, the notion of fairness 
has not yet been fully specified – particularly in terms of how these unfair practices 
differ in relation to known pathologies observed in several modern democracies. In 
this regard, extending the boundaries of non-democracy too far to cover this type of 
regime can be criticized for conceptual stretching. What is missing is an argument 
explaining why a limited degree of government contestability stemming from 
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formally open elections is a dimension of political regime classification – 
distinguishing democracy from authoritarianism - and not just a dimension of 
political behavior.  
 
The contribution of this article is that it aims to tackle this definitional problem by 
addressing the source of this conceptual ambiguity: ascertaining the way methods 
other than overt repression restrict rather than just influence political behavior and 
answering the question which state of affairs in political competition obstructs 
effective political participation. A stronger argument here will allow researchers to 
disqualify ‘low-repression, low-contestability’ regimes from the class of democracies 
without any need to scrutinize how extensively and systematically they have relied 
on typical authoritarian controls in order to directly restrict political participation.  
 
This article extends the concept of authoritarianism to include the use of soft tactics 
of political manipulation, such as co-optation in patron-client relations and its flip 
side, discrimination in the allocation of economic and social resources. It argues that 
conceptualizing democracy in purely procedural terms fails to capture how these 
tactics serve as informal restrictions to effective political competition in a formally 
open political system. It defends the view that authoritarianism can be conceptually 
broadened to include the input of informal socioeconomic sanctions in altering the 
opportunities for effective political participation. The article then juxtaposes and 
evaluates the procedural definitions and the pluralist approach to democracy. It 
explains why Dahl’s conception of democracy is more realistic about how a modern 
political system can empower its citizens and protect them from domination by a 
single political force.  
 
Conceptual ambiguity over the status of contestability: implications for regime 
classification  
 
In procedural terms, democracy is defined as a system that provides citizens with 
regular institutional opportunities to change the governing officials and a political 
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mechanism that allows the population to influence major decisions and choose 
among various contenders for political office (Lipset, 1960, p. 45). This system 
requires fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for 
votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote (Huntington, 
1991, p. 7). The procedural approach to democracy is represented by Schumpeter’s 
democratic method as an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter, 1942/1976, p. 269). In a democracy, political 
rights and civil liberties must be widely protected, including the freedom of the press, 
the freedom of association and the freedom to criticize the government without fear 
of reprisal, while the elected authorities must possess real power to govern and 
should not be subjected to the control of the military or the clergy (Levitsky and 
Way, 2002, p. 53). Several procedural definitions further elaborate on the specific 
procedural requirements which a political system must meet: both the chief executive 
and the legislative bodies are elected in regular popular elections, more than one 
party exists, all opposition forces are allowed to form independent parties and 
compete in elections, and the incumbent does not engage in outcome-changing 
electoral fraud (Przeworski et al., 1996, pp. 3-36). Insofar as citizens freely register 
their preferences without fear of suppression and intimidation and these preferences 
are not distorted by electoral fraud, this political system is a democracy. A more 
minimalist version of the procedural approach describes democracy as a political 
system in which the body of citizens has the capacity to peacefully overthrow their 
rulers without a violent revolution – a possibility that in all other regime types takes 
place through the use of force (Popper, 2002, p. 132. José Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland, 2010, p. 74). 
 
The procedural approach to democracy has been considerably modified by Robert 
Dahl who introduced the notion of polyarchy to describe actual political systems that 
meet what he viewed as ‘necessary’ yet ‘probably not sufficient’ conditions for ideal 
democracy: inclusive participation and public contestation (Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-9; 
1982, p. 6). Like the procedural definitions of democracy, Dahl’s polyarchy requires 
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that an open structure of participation offer its citizens civil liberties and political 
rights but, in addition, it makes contestability a definitional part of the concept of 
democracy. The political system must not simply permit the presence of an 
opposition but the participants in the political process must make use of real 
opportunities to challenge the incumbent with relatively strong opposition parties and 
autonomous civil society organizations. 
 
This view of democracy encapsulates a quintessentially pluralist view of politics 
according to which political participation is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of democracy, and government contestability must be an integral component of 
democracy. This position elevates a dimension of observed political behavior into a 
standard of regime classification, placing a higher threshold for actual political 
systems to pass in order to qualify as democracies: they must exhibit both inclusive 
participation and a good degree of public contestation, or in other words, they must 
not just offer an open structure of political competition, they must be characterized 
by a significant degree of political competitiveness (Sartori, 1976/2005, p. 194).  
Political contestability presupposes that collective organizations - active political 
parties, civil society organizations, labor unions and other professional associations - 
are autonomous from both the government and the government party, that they enjoy 
free access to independent sources of information and that they do indeed activate 
their democratic rights and freedoms (Dahl, 1971, p. 3). Political parties and other 
organizations must be capable of articulating their preferences in public debate, 
mobilizing support and disseminating their political messages. The exercise of 
political rights and civil liberties improves both the inclusiveness of the political 
system and the degree of government contestability (Dahl, 1971, pp. 4 and 14), but 
the latter can vary independently in instances in which political inclusion does not 
generate a considerable degree of public contestation. Dahl coined the term 
‘inclusive hegemony’ as a system that is inclusive in procedural terms but offers 
limited or virtually no opportunities for public contestation (Dahl, 1971, pp. 5 and 9). 
While there is a large space between the extreme values of full or no inclusion and 
full or no contestation, regimes that come close to these ‘poles’ can be seen as 
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‘nearly’ polyarchical or ‘nearly’ hegemonic (Dahl, 1971, pp. 8-9). The exact 
boundaries are not well specified, yet it follows that regimes that are ‘nearly 
hegemonic’ are not democracies.  
 
The two approaches to democracy generate conceptual ambiguity over the status of 
dominant party systems. The dominant position of a single political force is 
manifested in the length of incumbency, its duration in office, the size of 
parliamentary majorities, the size of the minority parties (Bogaards, 2004; Bogaards, 
and Bouçek, 2010) and the strong impact its government policies have on the 
national political agenda (Pempel, 1990, pp. 1-32, 4-4). In both accounts, dominant 
party systems that exhibit serious flaws in the operation of its political process will 
be classified as authoritarian; for instance, when the government party resorts to the 
systematic application of physical violence, electoral fraud and political intimidation 
or takes measures that selectively ban opposition parties or candidates from standing 
for election. This includes incumbents who are ready to call off elections if they 
anticipate a defeat or refuse to surrender power after a defeat (Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland, 2010, p. 70). Where regime classification has been inconclusive is about 
the status of dominant party systems that offer a formally open structure of public 
participation, the leadership makes no systematic use of typical authoritarian tools 
but the incumbent’s electoral defeat seems to be very unlikely in the near future 
(Pempel, 1990; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999).  
 
From a procedural perspective, a political system that exhibits low levels of 
government contestability is democratic insofar as this state of affairs is the result of 
the free exercise of citizens’ rights on the grounds and reflects their own free will 
(Arian and Barnes, 1974, p. 593). In procedural terms, as long as there are fully 
available formal rights offering citizens opportunities for participation which citizens 
have indeed exercised without restraint, it can be said that the electorate has freely 
chosen to elect a single party or a presidential candidate with an overwhelming 
majority and it has consequently allowed it to stay in government for a relatively 
longer period of time. In this view, a low degree of government contestability can be 
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seen as a legitimate outcome of that process as long as political rights and civil 
liberties are respected and there has been no use of typical authoritarian controls. 
One-party dominance may be an indication of increased party effectiveness in 
conditions of open political competition (Dunleavy, 2010), while the recurrent 
weakness of the opposition and civil society organizations can be attributed to their 
incapacity to articulate an equally appealing policy agenda.  
 
On the other side, regime classifications inspired by Robert Dahl’s ‘inclusive 
hegemony’ would classify actual party systems as authoritarian not only when direct 
interventions block or distort citizen’s participation but also when, despite the 
holding of competitive multiparty elections, other political forces consistently fail to 
act as effective competitors of the dominant party or president and have no hope of 
coming to power (Sartori 1976/2005, p. 173; Ware, 1996, pp. 159 and 165). Possible 
prominent cases include Belarus under Lukashenka (Korosteleva, 2003), Singapore 
under the People’s Action Party (Barr, 2014), Malaysia under the Barisan Nasional 
(Wong, Chin and Othman, 2010), Venezuela under Chavez (Corrales and Penfold-
Becerra, 2007) and Russia under Putin (Balzer, 2003; Colton and McFaul, 2003). In 
such cases, voting and, often, popular referendums reconfirmed the popularity of the 
leaders but they were conducted in conditions of mass-scale co-optation and 
socioeconomic pressure targeting the opposition and civic society organizations.  
 
This type of regime is the greyest conceptual category among a variety of regimes 
dubbed with terms such as illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 1997), demagogical 
democracies (Korosteleva, 2003), managed democracies (Colton and McFaul, 2003), 
defective democracies (Croissant, 2004; Merkel, 2004), semi-democracies 
(Gaziorowski, 1996) or, on the other side, with labels evocative of authoritarianism 
such as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010), electoral 
authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006; 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Linz and Stepan, 
1996), hegemonic regimes (Diamond, 2002), semi-autocratic regimes (McFaul, 
2005) and sultanistic regimes (Eke and Kuzio, 2000). The absence of a clear 
demarcation line separating democracy from authoritarianism has left a large space 
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for ill-defined and overlapping regime typologies reflecting subjective and highly 
debatable views of democracy that ‘mask’ rather than solve the problem of 
conceptual ambiguity (Armory and Schamis, 2005; Munck, 2006; Storm, 2008, p. 
217). Part of the problem is associated with the different status of contestability in 
procedural and pluralist approaches of democracy and the resulting confusion with 
regard to the democratic credentials of dominant party systems with an open political 
process, a low degree of government contestability and limited possibility for 
alternation in office.  
 
Regime classification faces this problem whether it follows a dichotomous view of 
democracy versus authoritarianism (Huntington, 1991, p. 11; Przeworski et al., 2000; 
Cheibub et al., 2010), or adopts a continuous view of regime variation along a range 
between democracy and authoritarianism upon which actual political regimes can be 
placed on the basis of their performance (Dahl, 1971, p. 9; Bogaards, 2010). 
Continuous strategies have to set up thresholds over the length of the distance that 
exists between the ‘poles’ of democracy and authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002, pp. 
36-50; Munck, 2006, p. 28; Gilbert and Mohseni, 2011). Contestation can be taken as 
one of several dimensions that measure democracy along a continuum towards 
authoritarianism, and regime subtypes can be formulated following scales of 
measurement. Judged by their performance on contestability some dominant party 
systems will be classified as democratic, others as authoritarian and some will be 
positioned as ‘in-between' or ‘hybrid’ regimes. Dichotomous approaches must also 
specify a threshold along the dimension of contestation below which a dominant 
party system will fall outside the category of democratic regimes. Either way, 
dichotomous and continuous strategies of regime classification must first define 
whether low government contestability must be placed inside or outside the 
conceptual boundaries of democracy.  
 
This problem is also visible on the part of the literature seeking to define the concept 
of dictatorship. Is a dictatorship a regime that represents only ‘the preferences of a 
sub-group of the population, as Acemoglu and Robinson claim (2006, p. 17; a 
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procedural view by Brooker too, 2000, p. 3)? If this is the case, dominant party 
systems with a popular leadership are left outside this definition. If democracy is a 
system in which the whole population has been given a say in the selection of the 
leader who can only be elected with the support of a winning coalition consisting of a 
plurality of votes (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), dominant party systems of the 
type described earlier are democracies with a number of procedural flaws. For other 
scholars, however, single-party dictatorship exists even in the presence of elections if 
one political party remains in office uninterruptedly, holding regular multi-party 
elections and winning supermajorities while considering using repression as the last 
resort (Magaloni, 2006, p. 32). Moreover, the degree of contestability between 
elections during tenure is relevant if authoritarian regimes are defined as systems 
with limited, non-responsive political pluralism (Linz, 1975, p. 255) and the 
definition of pluralism covers not just public participation but also the actual degree 
of government contestability. But contestability between elections is irrelevant if we 
stick to the definition that dictatorships lack contested elections altogether 
(Przeworksi et. al., 2000, p.15). 
 
 
 
 
Limited contestability and the notion of informal authoritarian controls 
 
Whether a low degree of government contestability - in the presence of formal 
participatory opportunities - suffices to disqualify political systems from the category 
of democracy or whether it must be viewed as a legitimate outcome of political 
behavior is an issue that can be addressed by examining the close connection 
between what influences political behavior and how the nature of this influence 
qualifies the character of the political system itself. In this direction, Sartori talks 
about the existence of ‘equal opportunities’ that enable effective political 
contestation and argues that a sizeable voting distance separating the government 
party from the main opposition party does not suffice to classify a party system as 
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hegemonic (Sartori, 1987, p. 201). If the major party is consistently supported by the 
winning majority of the voters and other parties exist as legal and legitimate - if not 
necessarily effective - competitors, this is a democratic system, which Sartori called 
a ‘predominant’ party system (Sartori, 1987, p. 195). By contrast, a ‘hegemonic’ 
party system only allows other parties to operate so long as they do not come close to 
gaining power. What distinguishes a hegemonic party system from a predominant 
party system is that in the latter ‘alteration in power is not ruled out and the political 
system provides ample opportunities for open and effective dissent’ (Sartori, 1987, p. 
200). Sartori, however, does not clarify which practices help a party’s strategy 
become predominant and which practices deprive the opposition of real opportunities 
to contest the government, effectively ruling out alteration in power and sustaining 
hegemony.  
 
Scholars of democracy have addressed this question by assessing the ‘fairness’ of the 
political process and developing a broader view of authoritarian manipulation. 
Politically dominant leaders may allow regularly-held elections and competition 
from political parties to mimic democracies but these pseudo-democratic institutions 
serve to legitimate the system and demonstrate the popularity of the ruling group 
(Schedler, 2006; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). In that 
context, limiting the degree of government contestability may primarily rely on soft 
manipulative tactics such as clientelism, pork-barrel politics, excessive rent 
distribution and state propaganda (Magaloni, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010; 
Gerschewski, 2013). Unlike typical authoritarian tools, these practices do not impose 
direct restrictions to the formal structure of participation but they, nonetheless, act as 
socioeconomic pressure that affects choices of political behavior, undermining the 
integrity of elections and leading to ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler, 2006; 
2009). In this view, the electoral playing field is skewed in favor of the ruling party 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010) and multi-party electoral competition actually ‘masks the 
reality of authoritarian domination’ (Diamond, 2002, p. 24; Linz, 2000, p. 159). In 
that light, a dominant system can be regarded as an authoritarian regime when the 
cost imposed on supporting the opposition is high, pervasive and fundamentally 
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important in altering the participation decisions of prospective political activists 
(Greene, 2010, p. 810). 
 
From the procedural approach to democracy, however, regarding soft manipulative 
practices as equivalent to typical authoritarian controls directly restricting political 
behavior can be seen as a case of ‘conceptual stretching’. This is because soft 
manipulative practices such as patronage supply, the use of state resources 
generating incumbent campaign advantages, the manipulation of the economy 
(through government spending following the electoral cycle, and pork-barrel 
distributions), or even vote-buying and informal employment blacklisting have been 
extensively used in democracies too. It is problematic to equate these practices with 
typical authoritarian controls, since they do pose formal restrictions to political 
participation and they do not coerce voters with physical violence, penalties and legal 
sanctions. In this view, while practices of soft manipulation generate flaws in the 
quality of political competition, they can be seen as pathologies of a working 
democracy, if the political system maintains an open and inclusive structure of 
political participation and the electoral outcome genuinely reflects the popularity of 
the incumbent without any electoral irregularities distorting the electoral result. In 
essence, dominant parties whose electoral strategies primarily or exclusively rely on 
these practices enjoy a higher degree of incumbent advantage than government 
parties in multi-party systems (Cf. Treisman, 2011), and the emergent political 
system may be  classified, at most, as a flawed or ‘managed’ democracy depending 
on the extent to which these soft manipulative practices are used.  
 
The issue is, therefore, to specify under which circumstances soft manipulation 
practices can be equated to authoritarian controls restricting political behavior, rather 
than just influencing it, which would then define accordingly the nature of the regime 
that uses them as authoritarian. Political hegemony, attained by soft manipulative 
practices, understandably raises questions about the actual degree of competition 
permitted by the system (Huntington, 1991, p. 7). It is plausible to imagine 
circumstances in which soft manipulative practices act similarly as coercive controls 
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and can be equated with typical authoritarian methods of restricting political 
behavior when, under certain conditions, serve as socioeconomic sanctions on 
dissenting political behavior with a scale and intensity that produce an adjustment of 
citizens’ decisions similar to the behavioral response that is triggered by fear of 
systematic violent repression in typical authoritarian regimes (Trantidis, 2015). The 
threshold after which ‘soft’ manipulative political methods act as effective 
limitations to political participation and work in ways comparable to coercion in 
typical authoritarian systems can be placed in the absence of ‘exit’ for the targeted 
citizens. Fear of reprisal allows these practices to operate as effective socioeconomic 
penalties placing informal restrictions to public participation. In these circumstances, 
these strategies can be conceptually equated with typical authoritarian coercion in a 
way compatible with the procedural definition of democracy, on the basis that 
restrictions to political participation can take any form of pressure that involves 
intimidation and the threat of punishment, whether it is imprisonment, violence or 
inescapable damage from socioeconomic penalties.  
 
This line of argument raises an objection to the democratic credentials of a dominant 
party system in procedural terms and brings our attention to the informal 
mechanisms obstructing political behavior and thereby limiting democratic 
participation and fundamentally altering the meaning of elections into a mechanism 
for ‘legitimation, patronage and elite management’ (Morgenbesser,  2014). It thus 
builds ‘a conceptual bridge’ between the procedural definition of democracy and 
Dahl’s position on contestability. 
 
Contestability as a minimal standard for democracy 
 
While the conception of soft manipulative practices as authoritarian under certain 
circumstances broadens the boundaries of authoritarianism to include dominant party 
systems that make a systematic use of them, it does not solve the definitional 
question about democracy. Various definitions draw on different normative visions 
of which ideal state of affairs political systems must meet: what the necessary 
 
 
14 
 
ingredients of a democratic political structure should be. This diversity essentially 
compels us to adjudicate between competing value judgments. The problem is that 
normative conceptions are not commensurable against one another in order to enable 
some form of objective comparative evaluation, and it is thus difficult to find a 
neutral arbiter for dissimilar value judgments. However, the previous discussion on 
the practices that effectively restrict political participation under a facade of 
‘democratic institutions’ points to the direction that can help us address the 
definitional problem in greater depth -  whether government contestability as a state 
of affairs is a constitutive property of a democratic political system. 
 
The benchmark for this comparative evaluation can be found in the basic democratic 
ideal which different visions of democracy consider to be the state of affairs which a 
democracy must reach at a minimum. ‘This ‘lowest common denominator’ is present 
in the etymology of democracy - consisting of the words demos, the citizenry, and 
kratos, power - and entails the vision of popular sovereignty as the subjugation of 
political power (kratos) to those upon whom it is exercised (the demos). These two 
notions of different visions of ‘ideal’ democracy have historically stood in an 
antithetical relation: on the one side, political power, which is authoritative, binding 
and all-encompassing within a given jurisdiction and, on the other, its subjects - the 
body of citizens. Democracy thus places a difficult target, to achieve a synthesis of 
the antithesis in a system of governance that must adequately empower the body of 
citizens (demos) so that they could exert a substantial degree of influence on state 
power (kratos), and at the same time it will protect them from the usurpation of 
power by a single group who would wish to impose its will on all others (becoming 
the ‘kratos’ itself). Democracies must approximate these two basic conditions: 
citizen’s political empowerment and protection from domination by a group or a 
coalition of groups. Both the procedural and the pluralist conceptions of democracy 
put forward their own thesis on how contemporary political societies can meet these 
standards; the former focuses on procedural requirements while the latter adds the 
dimension of contestability. The two approaches can thus be assessed and compared 
on the basis of how realistic their prescriptions are in achieving political 
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empowerment and preventing political domination, given the pragmatic terms in 
which political competition takes place. 
 
How political empowerment is attainable 
 
Procedural definitions of democracy convey confidence in the capacity of political 
systems with fully respected civil rights and free elections to enable citizens to 
exercise effective control over political power and exert influence on policy 
outcomes. This political system approximates the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’, 
insofar as ‘public policies are determined either directly by the vote of the electorate 
or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a 
process in which each voter who chooses to vote counts equally’ (Pennock, 1979, p. 
7). In this political system, leaders and organizations ‘define the alternatives of 
public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making 
process’ (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 141). For Schumpeter, for instance, the 
democratic process is ‘the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, 
which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide on issues 
through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will’ 
(Schumpeter, 1942/1976, p. 250, emphasis added). An open process for political 
participation and expression can also help citizens achieve even broader ambitions 
with regard to what they view as ideal patterns of social development. Democracy as 
‘government by the people’ allows the development of human capacities to the 
utmost, through free and full discussion of common problems and interests (Pennock, 
1979, p. 7). 
 
This process tends to generate a competitive political system, as actors and groups 
will most likely articulate competing claims, and leaders and organizations propose 
alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can choose and shape by 
taking part in the decision-making process (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 141). The most 
probable outcome of civic participation would be a high degree of political 
competitiveness as the result of the activities of social actors endowed with political 
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rights to propose and react to policy initiatives. This state of affairs generates an 
inherently competitive political arena.  
 
The fact that social heterogeneity, when unobstructed by authoritarian controls, tends 
to generate a high degree of political competition, invites us to see the political 
process through the lens of political pluralism. Central to the pluralist conception of 
politics is that a society inhabited by heterogeneous and often conflicting interests 
will tend to generate rival organizations, political parties and factions with a diversity 
of preferences and identities. In the pluralist approach of politics democratic politics 
is essentially ‘competition among active democratic minorities, where a minority 
becomes a majority, or, inversely, the majority is thrown into a minority’ (Sartori, 
1967, p. 116). Democratic participation is effectuated through organizational 
pluralism primarily through the activities of political parties and, equally 
importantly, through the activities of other social groups such as unions, lobbies, 
professional associations etc. Political pluralism understands political competition as 
a struggle for power among groups whose outcome is primarily determined by the 
dynamics of collective action: shifting alliances and the distribution of resources. In 
that light, the ‘demos’ is seen not as a single collectivity with a dominant will which 
the democratic process is supposed to identify and promote but, rather, it is a 
community consisting of competing social and political actors whose interests they 
primarily express and pursue by means of collective action. Social actors in 
competition with one another will form active groups on the basis of shared 
preferences to engage in collective action. Resource endowments define the capacity 
of each political organization to effectively perform the tasks necessary for success 
in the political arena. This is equally true for political parties that represent bundles 
of political and ideological preferences. Political parties must possess and utilize 
material resources and recruit and mobilize active members in order to galvanize 
broader electoral support.  
 
This perception of democratic politics indicates why organizational pluralism is the 
structure that sustains the viability of political competition in large-scale political 
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systems on which isolated citizens cannot exert much influence (Dahl, 1982, p. 12). 
While elections and participatory processes generate a set of opportunities available 
to citizens, it is collective action through which citizens become effective 
participants with the capacity to influence the political agenda in complex decision-
making processes. Hence, the pluralist view goes a step further: political rights 
equally distributed among its constituent citizens are mostly valuable exactly because 
they generate a free arena for the collective expression of conflicting social interests 
in the sphere of politics. The ideal of popular sovereignty - the synthesis of the 
antithesis - is achievable only to the extent that in a competitive political arena, social 
actors, by pooling their resources, can become effective political participants and 
may even overcome structural disadvantages which they face as individuals. 
Democracy through the pluralist lens is not reduced to the presence of formal rights 
and free, fair, and recurring elections, but it involves the active expression of 
multiple interests through collective action and with autonomous sources of 
information (Morlino, 1986, p. 54). Unlike the procedural approach to democracy, 
this pluralist view endorses a definition of democracy in which the presence of a 
strong opposition and regular alternation of parties in government is its necessary 
component (Cf. Przeworski et al., 1996; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). Limited 
contestability in an otherwise open structure of participation can only be seen as a 
serious anomaly, given the presence of heterogeneous interests and conflicting 
claims, and this state of affairs points to the existence of strong informal barriers to 
the collective expression of citizens and significant asymmetries in the availability of 
resources to the opposition forces and civil society organizations.  
 
Encapsulating the pluralist view of the social world, polyarchy explicitly highlights 
the long distance which an actual political system should travel to approximate the 
ideal of the ‘rule of the demos’. By acknowledging the reality of the numerous 
affiliations and multiple preferences of the citizens, polyarchy breaks down the 
notion of demos into its constituent parts, the polloi who articulate competing claims 
in politics through collective action. Relatively autonomous organizations are a 
necessary component of democracy, ‘both as a prerequisite for its operation and as 
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an inevitable consequence of its institutions (Dahl, 1982, pp. 5, 11, 50, 36).  This is a 
pragmatic thesis on how modern societies can meet basic normative conditions for 
democracy in the real context of inter-group antagonisms and power asymmetries. 
 
How citizens’ defense from political domination is feasible 
 
The second requirement of democracy is that citizens must be protected from 
domination by a single group or a coalition of groups so that democracy would not 
degenerate into oligarchy. Procedural definitions of democracy put faith in the 
capacity of an open structure of participation to prevent this outcome thanks to 
equally distributed political rights and civil liberties that allow citizens to exercise 
considerable control over the structure of collective decision-making in their capacity 
as voters or members of parties and other social groups. Modern democracy offers ‘a 
variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and 
values’ (Schmitter, and Karl, 1991, p. 78). In this view, democratic rights and 
institutions set in motion and safeguard a free sphere of political participation. 
 
This procedural standard, however, almost tautologically equates democratic 
institutions with the absence of domination: citizens unobstructed by repression, 
intimidation and manipulation will be free to participate in politics and express their 
views. Process leads to outcome. Does this premise fully capture the conditions 
necessary for organizational pluralism to emerge, flourish and survive, as discussed 
previously? Concentrations of organizational resources can effectuate one-group 
dominance even under the strictest procedural rules of participation and 
constitutional safeguards of the Madisonian type. Procedural definitions of 
democracy cannot capture the possibility that a group or a political party gets the 
critical advantage in terms of organization and resources and becomes politically 
dominant by effectively thwarting the organizational capacity of competing political 
forces (Dahl, 1982, p. 38). The definitions leave outside their conceptual lens the 
prospect of a single political force obtaining a hegemonic political position without 
placing formal limits to political participation. 
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Robert Dahl described this possibility as the problem of democratic pluralism (Dahl, 
1982). On the one hand, social diversity is expected to generate a substantive degree 
of political contestability in a genuinely open system of political participation while, 
on the other, it is possible that a procedurally democratic regime will degenerate into 
hegemony if one group or alliance of groups enjoys an advantage in organizational 
resources that no other alliance of social forces can rival. The systematic use of state 
resources by a political force with great intensity and on a large scale can produce – 
through manipulation of political behavior - an effect on political competition similar 
to what coercion in a typically repressive regime leads to: authoritarian control over 
political behavior. This outcome is more likely to happen when a group gains 
monopoly access to state resources which by their own nature cannot be matched by 
any other pool of resources. Hence, in the pluralist view of democracy, political 
rights and civil liberties rights, albeit a necessary condition for democracy, give each 
citizen a modicum of influence over political decision-making (Dahl, 1971, pp. 12-
13). It is collective action that gives citizens the actual capacity to influence political 
processes as well as the organizational ability to contest the use of state power and 
protest against its abuses. As evidence has shown, mass participation and party 
competition has been more effective than procedural checks in diminishing the use of 
repression by a dominant political force holding elections (Davenport 2007, p. 115). 
 
The pluralist approach tells us how the reverse of the democratic ideal, namely 
domination by one group, can occur even when a formally open democratic process 
is in place. The question of how to subordinate political power to people, and achieve 
the institutional synthesis of ‘kratos’ and ‘demos’, is recast as the issue of preserving 
organizational pluralism: how vertical power relations between individuals and state 
power and horizontal power relations among citizens and their groups must be 
configured so that politics remains a neutral arena for diverse social groups to 
compete over policy (Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952; Dahl, 1961). This presupposes a 
balance of power in which no group gains an unparalleled resource advantage that 
would give it control over the whole political system, the state and its bureaucracy. 
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In that state of affairs, attempts by one group to dominate will be prevented by the 
collective organization of others (Dahl, 1971, pp. 15-16, and 48). In party politics, 
this means that the strength of the government party can be offset by the 
organizational strength of the opposition forces. Insofar as collective action in a 
political society is constantly reconfigured in a way that the distribution of power 
resources among competing groups is more or less symmetrical, this will generate a 
system of ‘mutual controls’ and this system can sustain democracy (Dahl, 1982, pp. 
32, 34, 36, 43). In this pluralist view, contestability both safeguards democracy and 
is identified with it conceptually.  Hence, it must not just be seen as a derivative of 
the democratic process but must be placed as a constitutive element of its very 
definition. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whether the position of government contestability is a constitutive part of the 
definition of democracy or not has created noticeable ambiguity regarding the 
democratic credentials of dominant party systems that limit their exposure to political 
contestation not by the systematic use of repressive tactics but by primarily relying 
on co-optation and soft manipulation. To classify these regimes, the article addresses 
the source of this conceptual ambiguity: a) whether low contestability is a legitimate 
outcome of democratic process or a fault of the political system that places it outside 
the boundaries of democracy and b) whether practices other than repression – which 
are employed to limit contestability – are interventions simply on the dimension of 
political behavior or affect the dimension of political regime classification too.  
 
The article argues that, besides direct repression, soft manipulative tactics limiting 
government contestability may actually restrict free political participation in ways 
similar to typical authoritarian controls, and can thus be equated with typical 
authoritarian controls. This enables classifying the regimes that primarily rely on 
these tactics as authoritarian. It also argues that Dahl’s polyarchy captures the full 
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distance which political societies must travel to meet the basic standards of 
democracy. Polyarchy understands that political power stems from collective 
organization in political parties and civil society organizations and has a wider grasp 
of the actual limits to political empowerment that can lead to one-group domination 
in a formally open democratic system. Polyarchy also offers an elaborate view of 
how domination is possible in a system open to political participation and indicates 
how this prospect can be prevented in the context of organizational pluralism. A 
group in control of the state’s unmatched resources for manipulation can skew the 
pattern of collective action in its favor. This state of affairs allows a single political 
force to dominate over all others. In this regard, lack of government contestability 
implies that there are serious deficiencies in the structure of political organization 
associated with informal restrictions to effective political participation. 
Hence, government contestability is necessary for citizens in order to exert political 
influence and protect themselves from political domination, which is the minimum 
that a democracy can offer. Contestability is not simply a desirable outcome of the 
democratic process but a constitutive part of the definition of democracy.  
 
The procedural approach is not necessarily incompatible with the pluralist view of 
political reality, but by omitting to incorporate it explicitly as an integral part of the 
definition of democracy, it ignores crucial parameters of collective action which 
serve as vehicles of civic empowerment as well as tactics other than direct repression 
that pose informal restrictions to effective political participation. Because of this 
omission, any effort to define democracy in strictly procedural terms can easily 
overlook how a political force can establish a hegemonic position in a formally open 
political system.  
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